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From net neutrality to ICT neutrality / / Patrick Maillé and Bruno Tuffin
| From net neutrality to ICT neutrality / / Patrick Maillé and Bruno Tuffin |
| Autore | Maillé Patrick |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (194 pages) |
| Disciplina | 215 |
| Soggetto topico |
Computer science
Network neutrality |
| ISBN | 3-031-06271-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Authors -- Acronyms -- 1 Introduction: A Bit of History -- 1.1 The Advent of the Digital Economy and the Need for Regulation -- 1.2 The Internet: Worries About the Lack of Neutrality -- 1.3 New Services: New Difficulties and Potential Hindrance to Society -- 1.4 Toward ICT Neutrality? -- 1.5 Goal and Organization of This Book -- 2 Definitions -- 2.1 Several Definitions of Neutrality -- 2.2 Analysis and Comparison -- 2.3 Specialized Services -- 2.3.1 Perimeter of Specialized Services -- 2.3.2 Need for Specialized Services -- 2.3.3 Implications of Introducing a Special Class of Service -- 2.4 Zero-Rating and Sponsored Data -- 2.5 Public Consultations -- 2.6 Worldwide Implementations -- 2.6.1 North America -- 2.6.1.1 USA -- 2.6.1.2 Canada -- 2.6.1.3 Mexico -- 2.6.2 Europe -- 2.6.2.1 European Union -- 2.6.2.2 France -- 2.6.2.3 Germany -- 2.6.2.4 United Kingdom -- 2.6.2.5 The Netherlands -- 2.6.2.6 Norway -- 2.6.2.7 Slovenia -- 2.6.2.8 Russia -- 2.6.3 Asia -- 2.6.3.1 China -- 2.6.3.2 Japan -- 2.6.3.3 South Korea -- 2.6.3.4 India -- 2.6.4 Oceania -- 2.6.4.1 Australia -- 2.6.4.2 New Zealand -- 2.6.5 South America -- 2.6.5.1 Chile -- 2.6.5.2 Brazil -- 2.6.6 Africa -- 2.7 A Situation Still Evolving -- 2.8 A Trade-Off with Users Deciding Differentiation? -- 2.9 Conclusions -- 3 Pros and Cons: The Arguments in the Debate -- 3.1 The ``Freedom'' Arguments: Whose Freedom? -- 3.1.1 [Pro-NN] Net Neutrality Is Needed to Guarantee Free Speech -- 3.1.2 [Anti-NN] Net Neutrality Hinders Operators' Freedom of Enterprise -- 3.2 The ``Investment'' Arguments -- 3.2.1 [Anti-NN] Returns on Investments Are Needed -- 3.2.2 [Pro-NN] More Customers, More Investments -- 3.3 The ``Competition and Innovation'' Arguments -- 3.3.1 [Pro-NN] Non-neutrality Biases the Competition Among Services.
3.3.2 [Anti-NN] ISPs Favoring Some Content Providers Stimulates ISP Competition (Through Content) -- 3.3.3 [Pro-NN] Neutrality Is Needed to Allow Innovating Newcomers -- 3.4 The ``Security and Privacy'' Arguments -- 3.4.1 [Anti-NN] Encryption Already Prevents Discrimination -- 3.4.2 [Pro-NN] Neutrality Helps Protect Privacy -- 3.5 The ``Welfare'' Arguments -- 3.5.1 [Pro-NN] Non-neutrality Would Lead to a Fragmented Internet, Which Is Bad For Users -- 3.5.2 [Anti-NN] Content Providers Should Contribute to the Infrastructure Costs to Reduce Users' Share -- 3.5.3 [Anti-NN] A Free Market Finds the Most Efficient Outcome -- 3.6 Conclusions -- 4 Mathematical Analysis -- 4.1 Introduction to Mathematical Modeling and Game Theory -- 4.1.1 Elements of Non-cooperative Game Theory -- 4.1.2 Output Analysis -- 4.1.3 Principle of Mechanism Design -- 4.2 A Basic Model -- 4.3 Model with Two Content Providers -- 4.3.1 Pricing Game Between CPs (α=2) -- 4.3.2 Fully Neutral Case (α=2) -- 4.3.3 Weakly Neutral Case (α=2) -- 4.3.4 Non-neutral Case (α=2) -- 4.3.5 Comparison -- 4.4 Other Conclusions from the Literature -- 4.5 Additional Notes -- 5 Non-neutrality Pushed by Content Providers -- 5.1 Non-neutrality as a Barrier to Entry Protecting Incumbents -- 5.1.1 Modeling the Impact of a New Entrant CP -- 5.1.2 Actors' Revenues and Decision Time Scales -- 5.1.2.1 CP Revenues -- 5.1.2.2 ISP Revenue -- 5.1.2.3 Order of Decisions -- 5.1.3 Analyzing the Game for Fixed Side Payments -- 5.1.3.1 User Decisions -- 5.1.3.2 ISP Subscription Price pA -- 5.1.3.3 Should the New CP Enter the Market? -- 5.1.3.4 Illustration Example: Impact of the Side Payment -- 5.1.4 Can the ISP and the Incumbent CP Agree on Side Payments? -- 5.1.4.1 Side Payments Maximizing the ISP Revenue Are Not Sustainable -- 5.1.4.2 Can Side Payments Benefit Both the Incumbent CP and the ISP?. 5.1.4.3 How Can the ISP and Incumbent CP Agree on a Side Payment Level? -- 5.1.4.4 What About Users? Should the Regulator Intervene? -- 5.1.5 Refining the Model -- 5.2 Sponsored Data and Zero Rating -- 5.2.1 Modeling Sponsored-Data Practices in a Competitive ISP Context -- 5.2.1.1 Users' Decisions and Preferences -- 5.2.1.2 The CP Side: Advertising and Sponsoring -- 5.2.1.3 ISP Price Competition -- 5.2.1.4 Order of Decisions -- 5.2.2 How Does the CP Decide to Sponsor and Add Advertisement? -- 5.2.2.1 The Pricing Game Played by ISPs -- 5.2.3 A Practice Finally Mostly Benefiting ISPs? -- 5.3 When Big CPs Designate the ``Good'' ISPs: Incentivizing Non-neutrality Without Paying -- 5.3.1 ISP Competition: The Importance of Looking Good -- 5.3.2 A Two-ISP, Two-CP model with Heterogeneous Users -- 5.3.2.1 Modelling Consumer (Heterogeneous) Usage of Different CPs -- 5.3.2.2 ISPs Deciding How to Allocate Their Capacity Affects CP Quality -- 5.3.2.3 Introducing Some Asymmetry Among CPs: Required Throughput -- 5.3.2.4 Users Care About the Quality of the Services They Use! -- 5.3.2.5 A (Simple) Game on Differentiation -- 5.3.3 User Equilibria: How ISP Decisions Affect User Subscription Choices -- 5.3.4 The Game Among ISPs and Its Consequences -- 5.3.4.1 At the Equilibrium, Both ISPs Differentiate the Same Way -- 5.3.4.2 Equilibrium vs Neutral Capacity Allocation: Neutrality Hindering Innovation? -- 5.3.4.3 Equilibrium vs Neutral Capacity Allocation: No Impact for ISPs -- 5.3.4.4 Equilibrium vs Neutral Capacity Allocation: What About Users? -- 5.3.5 A Model Yielding Unexpected Conclusions -- 5.4 Conclusions -- 6 A More General View of Neutrality -- 6.1 Is It Relevant to Generalize Network Neutrality? -- 6.2 Content Delivery Networks: Intermediaries Flying Under the Radar? -- 6.2.1 Introduction to CDN Role and Impact. 6.2.2 Model Illustrating the Impact of CDNs on Competition Between CPs -- 6.2.3 Model Illustrating the Impact of CDNs on Competition Between ISPs -- 6.3 Issues Related to Vertical Integration -- 6.3.1 Vertical Integration and the Internet Ecosystem -- 6.3.2 Illustration of Vertical Integration on Our Basic Model -- 6.3.3 Other Illustrations and Results from Models -- 6.4 Device Neutrality -- 6.5 Neutrality of Structuring Platforms -- 6.6 Also Toward Data Neutrality? -- 7 Search Neutrality -- 7.1 Is It in Search Engines' Interest to Be Neutral? -- 7.1.1 Modeling the Long-Term vs. Short-Term Gains Trade-Off -- 7.1.1.1 Modeling Requests as Random Pairs of Vectors -- 7.1.1.2 Click-Through-Rate: Impact of Position and Relevance -- 7.1.1.3 Frequency of Requests and SE Objective Function -- 7.1.1.4 How Would a Neutral SE Work? -- 7.1.2 The Revenue-Maximizing Ranking Policy: An (Almost) Explicit Trade-Off Between Relevance and Gains -- 7.1.3 Neutral vs. Non-neutral Search Engine: What Are the Differences? -- 7.1.3.1 A Simple Example with 10 Actors -- 7.1.3.2 Ad Revenues Are Good for Result Quality! -- 7.1.3.3 Should Users Care Whether Their SE Is Neutral? -- 7.1.3.4 Quantifying How Non-neutrality Distorts Competition Among CPs -- 7.1.3.5 Impact of Search (Non-)Neutrality on Innovation -- 7.2 Detecting Bias and Trying to Build a ``Neutral'' Search Engine -- 7.2.1 A Look At Related Contributions -- 7.2.2 An Estimation of Page Relevance: Average Page Visibility -- 7.2.3 Quantifying How ``Consensual'' a Search Engine Is:The SE Score -- 7.2.4 Pointing Out Possible Bias: Statistical Tests -- 7.2.5 Aggregating Results from SEs to Create Meta-SEs -- 7.2.5.1 The Consensus Ranking -- 7.2.5.2 The Majority Judgment Ranking -- 7.2.5.3 Robustness to Bias: Consensus Ranking vs Majority Judgment -- 7.2.6 A Few Observations from a Campaign on 1000 Search Terms. 7.2.6.1 The ``Chrome'' Search Term -- 7.3 Conclusion -- 8 Algorithmic Transparency -- 8.1 Algorithmic Transparency and Structuring Platforms: Why Introduce Scrutiny? -- 8.2 Worries About the Transparency of Artificial Intelligence Algorithms -- 8.3 How to Proceed? -- 8.4 Fake News, Manipulation of Opinions, Hatred, and Fact Checking -- 8.5 Conclusion on Transparency and Neutrality -- 9 Tools to Monitor Neutrality -- 9.1 Why Are Specific Tools Needed? -- 9.2 Tools for the Monitoring of ISPs -- 9.2.1 Potential Infringements -- 9.2.2 Available Tools -- 9.2.3 The Limits of the Existing Tools -- 9.3 Monitoring Other Actors -- 9.3.1 Monitoring CDNs -- 9.3.2 Monitoring Search Engines -- 9.4 Tools and Algorithmic Transparency -- 9.5 Fact-Checking Tools -- 10 Conclusions -- References. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910629278203321 |
Maillé Patrick
|
||
| Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
From net neutrality to ICT neutrality / / Patrick Maillé and Bruno Tuffin
| From net neutrality to ICT neutrality / / Patrick Maillé and Bruno Tuffin |
| Autore | Maillé Patrick |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (194 pages) |
| Disciplina | 215 |
| Soggetto topico |
Computer science
Network neutrality |
| ISBN | 3-031-06271-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Authors -- Acronyms -- 1 Introduction: A Bit of History -- 1.1 The Advent of the Digital Economy and the Need for Regulation -- 1.2 The Internet: Worries About the Lack of Neutrality -- 1.3 New Services: New Difficulties and Potential Hindrance to Society -- 1.4 Toward ICT Neutrality? -- 1.5 Goal and Organization of This Book -- 2 Definitions -- 2.1 Several Definitions of Neutrality -- 2.2 Analysis and Comparison -- 2.3 Specialized Services -- 2.3.1 Perimeter of Specialized Services -- 2.3.2 Need for Specialized Services -- 2.3.3 Implications of Introducing a Special Class of Service -- 2.4 Zero-Rating and Sponsored Data -- 2.5 Public Consultations -- 2.6 Worldwide Implementations -- 2.6.1 North America -- 2.6.1.1 USA -- 2.6.1.2 Canada -- 2.6.1.3 Mexico -- 2.6.2 Europe -- 2.6.2.1 European Union -- 2.6.2.2 France -- 2.6.2.3 Germany -- 2.6.2.4 United Kingdom -- 2.6.2.5 The Netherlands -- 2.6.2.6 Norway -- 2.6.2.7 Slovenia -- 2.6.2.8 Russia -- 2.6.3 Asia -- 2.6.3.1 China -- 2.6.3.2 Japan -- 2.6.3.3 South Korea -- 2.6.3.4 India -- 2.6.4 Oceania -- 2.6.4.1 Australia -- 2.6.4.2 New Zealand -- 2.6.5 South America -- 2.6.5.1 Chile -- 2.6.5.2 Brazil -- 2.6.6 Africa -- 2.7 A Situation Still Evolving -- 2.8 A Trade-Off with Users Deciding Differentiation? -- 2.9 Conclusions -- 3 Pros and Cons: The Arguments in the Debate -- 3.1 The ``Freedom'' Arguments: Whose Freedom? -- 3.1.1 [Pro-NN] Net Neutrality Is Needed to Guarantee Free Speech -- 3.1.2 [Anti-NN] Net Neutrality Hinders Operators' Freedom of Enterprise -- 3.2 The ``Investment'' Arguments -- 3.2.1 [Anti-NN] Returns on Investments Are Needed -- 3.2.2 [Pro-NN] More Customers, More Investments -- 3.3 The ``Competition and Innovation'' Arguments -- 3.3.1 [Pro-NN] Non-neutrality Biases the Competition Among Services.
3.3.2 [Anti-NN] ISPs Favoring Some Content Providers Stimulates ISP Competition (Through Content) -- 3.3.3 [Pro-NN] Neutrality Is Needed to Allow Innovating Newcomers -- 3.4 The ``Security and Privacy'' Arguments -- 3.4.1 [Anti-NN] Encryption Already Prevents Discrimination -- 3.4.2 [Pro-NN] Neutrality Helps Protect Privacy -- 3.5 The ``Welfare'' Arguments -- 3.5.1 [Pro-NN] Non-neutrality Would Lead to a Fragmented Internet, Which Is Bad For Users -- 3.5.2 [Anti-NN] Content Providers Should Contribute to the Infrastructure Costs to Reduce Users' Share -- 3.5.3 [Anti-NN] A Free Market Finds the Most Efficient Outcome -- 3.6 Conclusions -- 4 Mathematical Analysis -- 4.1 Introduction to Mathematical Modeling and Game Theory -- 4.1.1 Elements of Non-cooperative Game Theory -- 4.1.2 Output Analysis -- 4.1.3 Principle of Mechanism Design -- 4.2 A Basic Model -- 4.3 Model with Two Content Providers -- 4.3.1 Pricing Game Between CPs (α=2) -- 4.3.2 Fully Neutral Case (α=2) -- 4.3.3 Weakly Neutral Case (α=2) -- 4.3.4 Non-neutral Case (α=2) -- 4.3.5 Comparison -- 4.4 Other Conclusions from the Literature -- 4.5 Additional Notes -- 5 Non-neutrality Pushed by Content Providers -- 5.1 Non-neutrality as a Barrier to Entry Protecting Incumbents -- 5.1.1 Modeling the Impact of a New Entrant CP -- 5.1.2 Actors' Revenues and Decision Time Scales -- 5.1.2.1 CP Revenues -- 5.1.2.2 ISP Revenue -- 5.1.2.3 Order of Decisions -- 5.1.3 Analyzing the Game for Fixed Side Payments -- 5.1.3.1 User Decisions -- 5.1.3.2 ISP Subscription Price pA -- 5.1.3.3 Should the New CP Enter the Market? -- 5.1.3.4 Illustration Example: Impact of the Side Payment -- 5.1.4 Can the ISP and the Incumbent CP Agree on Side Payments? -- 5.1.4.1 Side Payments Maximizing the ISP Revenue Are Not Sustainable -- 5.1.4.2 Can Side Payments Benefit Both the Incumbent CP and the ISP?. 5.1.4.3 How Can the ISP and Incumbent CP Agree on a Side Payment Level? -- 5.1.4.4 What About Users? Should the Regulator Intervene? -- 5.1.5 Refining the Model -- 5.2 Sponsored Data and Zero Rating -- 5.2.1 Modeling Sponsored-Data Practices in a Competitive ISP Context -- 5.2.1.1 Users' Decisions and Preferences -- 5.2.1.2 The CP Side: Advertising and Sponsoring -- 5.2.1.3 ISP Price Competition -- 5.2.1.4 Order of Decisions -- 5.2.2 How Does the CP Decide to Sponsor and Add Advertisement? -- 5.2.2.1 The Pricing Game Played by ISPs -- 5.2.3 A Practice Finally Mostly Benefiting ISPs? -- 5.3 When Big CPs Designate the ``Good'' ISPs: Incentivizing Non-neutrality Without Paying -- 5.3.1 ISP Competition: The Importance of Looking Good -- 5.3.2 A Two-ISP, Two-CP model with Heterogeneous Users -- 5.3.2.1 Modelling Consumer (Heterogeneous) Usage of Different CPs -- 5.3.2.2 ISPs Deciding How to Allocate Their Capacity Affects CP Quality -- 5.3.2.3 Introducing Some Asymmetry Among CPs: Required Throughput -- 5.3.2.4 Users Care About the Quality of the Services They Use! -- 5.3.2.5 A (Simple) Game on Differentiation -- 5.3.3 User Equilibria: How ISP Decisions Affect User Subscription Choices -- 5.3.4 The Game Among ISPs and Its Consequences -- 5.3.4.1 At the Equilibrium, Both ISPs Differentiate the Same Way -- 5.3.4.2 Equilibrium vs Neutral Capacity Allocation: Neutrality Hindering Innovation? -- 5.3.4.3 Equilibrium vs Neutral Capacity Allocation: No Impact for ISPs -- 5.3.4.4 Equilibrium vs Neutral Capacity Allocation: What About Users? -- 5.3.5 A Model Yielding Unexpected Conclusions -- 5.4 Conclusions -- 6 A More General View of Neutrality -- 6.1 Is It Relevant to Generalize Network Neutrality? -- 6.2 Content Delivery Networks: Intermediaries Flying Under the Radar? -- 6.2.1 Introduction to CDN Role and Impact. 6.2.2 Model Illustrating the Impact of CDNs on Competition Between CPs -- 6.2.3 Model Illustrating the Impact of CDNs on Competition Between ISPs -- 6.3 Issues Related to Vertical Integration -- 6.3.1 Vertical Integration and the Internet Ecosystem -- 6.3.2 Illustration of Vertical Integration on Our Basic Model -- 6.3.3 Other Illustrations and Results from Models -- 6.4 Device Neutrality -- 6.5 Neutrality of Structuring Platforms -- 6.6 Also Toward Data Neutrality? -- 7 Search Neutrality -- 7.1 Is It in Search Engines' Interest to Be Neutral? -- 7.1.1 Modeling the Long-Term vs. Short-Term Gains Trade-Off -- 7.1.1.1 Modeling Requests as Random Pairs of Vectors -- 7.1.1.2 Click-Through-Rate: Impact of Position and Relevance -- 7.1.1.3 Frequency of Requests and SE Objective Function -- 7.1.1.4 How Would a Neutral SE Work? -- 7.1.2 The Revenue-Maximizing Ranking Policy: An (Almost) Explicit Trade-Off Between Relevance and Gains -- 7.1.3 Neutral vs. Non-neutral Search Engine: What Are the Differences? -- 7.1.3.1 A Simple Example with 10 Actors -- 7.1.3.2 Ad Revenues Are Good for Result Quality! -- 7.1.3.3 Should Users Care Whether Their SE Is Neutral? -- 7.1.3.4 Quantifying How Non-neutrality Distorts Competition Among CPs -- 7.1.3.5 Impact of Search (Non-)Neutrality on Innovation -- 7.2 Detecting Bias and Trying to Build a ``Neutral'' Search Engine -- 7.2.1 A Look At Related Contributions -- 7.2.2 An Estimation of Page Relevance: Average Page Visibility -- 7.2.3 Quantifying How ``Consensual'' a Search Engine Is:The SE Score -- 7.2.4 Pointing Out Possible Bias: Statistical Tests -- 7.2.5 Aggregating Results from SEs to Create Meta-SEs -- 7.2.5.1 The Consensus Ranking -- 7.2.5.2 The Majority Judgment Ranking -- 7.2.5.3 Robustness to Bias: Consensus Ranking vs Majority Judgment -- 7.2.6 A Few Observations from a Campaign on 1000 Search Terms. 7.2.6.1 The ``Chrome'' Search Term -- 7.3 Conclusion -- 8 Algorithmic Transparency -- 8.1 Algorithmic Transparency and Structuring Platforms: Why Introduce Scrutiny? -- 8.2 Worries About the Transparency of Artificial Intelligence Algorithms -- 8.3 How to Proceed? -- 8.4 Fake News, Manipulation of Opinions, Hatred, and Fact Checking -- 8.5 Conclusion on Transparency and Neutrality -- 9 Tools to Monitor Neutrality -- 9.1 Why Are Specific Tools Needed? -- 9.2 Tools for the Monitoring of ISPs -- 9.2.1 Potential Infringements -- 9.2.2 Available Tools -- 9.2.3 The Limits of the Existing Tools -- 9.3 Monitoring Other Actors -- 9.3.1 Monitoring CDNs -- 9.3.2 Monitoring Search Engines -- 9.4 Tools and Algorithmic Transparency -- 9.5 Fact-Checking Tools -- 10 Conclusions -- References. |
| Record Nr. | UNISA-996499857903316 |
|
Maillé Patrick
|
||
| Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2022] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. di Salerno | ||
| ||